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The Karamazov Murder Trial:
Dostoevsky’s Rejoinder to Compassionate Acquittals
Affekt! For pity’s sake, this way one can say that
everything, every impression, is an affekt . . .Why,
every sort of adventure now is being called an
affekt! The sun rises in the morning – that’s an
affekt! A glance at the moon at night – that’s an
affekt! . . . Affekt is an awful word.
Dostoevsky, Notebooks, 1876-18771

Many readers of The Brothers Karamazov have long been puzzled by the lengthy
description of Dmitry Karamazov’s murder trial in the final section of Dostoevsky’s
novel. Why are readers, who have already listened to Ivan’s philosophically-charged
legend of the Grand Inquisitor, witnessed Alyosha’s mystical ecstasy in the Cana of
Galilee episode, and eavesdropped on Dmitry’s epiphanic dream about the poor,
suffering babe, suddenly subjected to such relatively undramatic (at times quite tedious
and repetitive) narrative material as the lengthy summation speeches delivered by the two
lawyers at Dmitry’s trial?2 Gary Rosenshield has argued that the egregious miscarriage
of justice that Dostoevsky depicts in the final section of The Brothers Karamazov, where
an innocent man is wrongly convicted in a court of law for a crime he did not commit,
may be read as the author’s attempt to dramatize in a work of fiction the strong
misgivings about the legal reforms of 1864 that he had been expressing in his Diary of a
Writer during the mid-1870s. More specifically, Rosenshield argues that the Karamazov
trial constitutes Dostoevsky’s novelistic reworking of his own journalistic commentary
on two particular jury trials, those of Stanislav Kronenberg and Ekaterina Kornilova, both

of which illustrated how Western law was, to Dostoevsky’s mind, standing in the way of
Russian justice.3
Rosenshield’s argument is particularly convincing in regard to the Kronenberg
case, where a father is acquitted of the crime of torturing his seven-year-old daughter by
beating her brutally with birch rods.4 Kronenberg’s defense counsel, Vladimir Spasovich
(1829-1906), who was known as the “king of the Russian bar,” is often mentioned as the
real-life inspiration for Fetiukovich, the fictional Petersburg attorney who is hired to
defend Dmitry Karamazov in Dostoevsky’s novel.5 Like Spasovich, the liberal
Fetiukovich is attracted to cases that have become notorious and to defendants who
appear indisputably guilty because of the great challenge they pose to a lawyer’s
oratorical and rhetorical skills (and because of the great glory an acquittal can bring to his
reputation as a talented barrister).6 Numerous other affinities can be found between the
real-life Spasovich and the fictional Fetiukovich: they both try to shift the jury’s
compassion from the victim of the crime to the defendant, they both allow their verbal
talent to ascend uncontrollably in the courtroom (Spasovich’s oratory is said to rise to the
height of the legendary “Pillars of Hercules”), and they both “decriminalize” their client’s
actions (Spasovich argues that the defendant was not “torturing” his daughter but merely
disciplining a highly unruly child). Most importantly, however, both Spasovich and
Fetiukovich are, to Dostoevsky’s mind, guilty of disseminating morally unsound ideas in
the courtroom through their eloquence, serving as conduits for liberal Western notions
about sin, crime, and moral responsibility that threaten to corrupt native Russian values.
Each of them is what the author in his final novel disdainfully calls an “adulterer” of
thought.7 Dostoevsky’s satiric depiction of the fictional Karamazov trial, Rosenshield
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argues, is thus designed in part to respond polemically to the compassionate acquittal
rendered in the Kronenberg trial.8
Rather than challenge Rosenshield’s compelling hypothesis, I would instead like
to extend it by arguing that the Karamazov trial can also be read as a novelistic reworking
of yet another legal case on which Dostoevsky had earlier provided journalistic
commentary: namely, the trial of Nastasya Kairova, a passionate, jealous, and impetuous
young actress who was acquitted of premeditated attempted murder in the violent
stabbing attack upon her sexual rival with a razor. Like Spasovich, Kairova’s defense
attorney, Evgeny Utin (1843-1894), sought to remove sympathy and compassion for the
actual victim of the crime, Mrs. Velikanova, the wife of the defendant’s lover, and to
place it instead upon Kairova, who is portrayed as a woman who was merely behaving
naturally – “like a lioness whose cub is being taken away” (23:14) – when she sought to
protect her lover from another woman. Utin not only argued that his client’s crime of
passion constituted an instance of temporary insanity; he also sought to justify her actions
as those of a woman truly and deeply in love. In his journalistic response to the
decriminalization of violent behavior advocated by Kairova’s lawyer, Dostoevsky
protested that evil must be called evil in a court of law and warned that Kairova’s
acquittal sends a very dangerous moral message not only to the defendant herself but also
to the Russian public at large. The verdict in the Karamazov trial, I will argue, may be
read as Dostoevsky’s attempt in a work of fiction to reverse the egregious miscarriage of
justice that had been perpetrated in the Kairova case and thus to send a very different
moral message to his Russian contemporaries.
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The Doctrine of the Environment: Abdicating Moral Responsibility

One of the similarities between the Kairova and Karamazov trials, as was just mentioned,
is the issue of jury compassion for the defendant. In an 1873 essay, titled “Environment,”
Dostoevsky had expressed surprise that the new peasant juries were consistently
acquitting defendants rather than convicting them (21:13). In seeking possible reasons
that might account for what he called this “mania” for acquittals, Dostoevsky notes that
some people have expressed the view that Russians are by nature a highly compassionate
people who do not want to ruin the life of a fellow human being (21:13). Moreover, he
adds, the fashionable Socialist doctrine of a “corrupting environment” exacerbates this
inherent propensity toward mercifulness on the part of Russians, because it asserts that
the criminal, as an unfortunate victim of a highly imperfect society, cannot be held
accountable for his or her actions:9
“Since society is so vilely organized, one can only break loose from it with a knife
in hand.” This is what the doctrine of the environment says, as opposed to
Christianity, which, while fully recognizing the pressure exerted by one’s
environment and having proclaimed mercy for the sinner, nonetheless places a
moral duty on each person to struggle with the environment and marks the
boundary where the environment ends and duty begins. In making each person
responsible, Christianity thereby acknowledges their freedom. The doctrine of the
environment, on the other hand, by making the individual dependent on every
flaw in the social structure, reduces him to an absolute nonentity, exempting him
totally from any personal moral responsibility as well as from all independence,
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and reduces him to the lowest, most loathsome form of slavery imaginable.10
(21:16)
“After all, when we have made ourselves better, we will also improve our environment
and make it better,” Dostoevsky asserts when describing the Christian alternative to the
Socialist doctrine of the environment (21:15). “And this is the only way it can be made
better. But for us to flee from our pity and acquit everyone so as not to have to suffer
ourselves – why, that’s too easy. Doing that, we slowly but surely come to the
conclusion that there are no crimes at all, and that ‘the environment is to blame’ for
everything” (21:15-16).
Three years later, in the May 1876 issue of Diary of a Writer, Dostoevsky
provides commentary on the Kairova case, where the defense strategy, as we shall soon
see, was centered mainly on the claim of temporary insanity rather than the doctrine of
the environment. Although Utin at the trial did address his client’s family history of
alcoholism and mental illness as well as her social milieu as an actress, Dostoevsky’s
commentary does not touch upon the twin issues of heredity and environment. Instead,
near the end of his remarks on the Kairova case, Dostoevsky savagely caricatures the way
a defense attorney is likely to invoke the doctrine of the environment to exonerate another
violent female defendant: in this instance, a young woman who threw her six-year-old
stepdaughter from a fourth-floor window.11 “By the way, I can already imagine how
lawyers would defend this stepmother,” he writes.
They would point out her hopeless, desperate situation and the fact that she is a
young wife who was forced to marry a widower or who made a terrible mistake
by marrying him voluntarily. Then they would paint pictures of the poverty-
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stricken daily lives of poor people, their never-ending labor. This guileless,
innocent maiden got married, thinking, like a naive inexperienced girl . . . that
there are only joys to be found in married life. But instead of joys there was the
laundering of soiled linens, the сooking of meals, the bathing of children, –
“Gentlemen of the jury, she naturally had to hate this child . . . and in a moment of
despair, in a sudden fit of madness, almost as if she did not know what she was
doing, she grabs this young girl and . . . Gentlemen of the jury, which one of you
would not have done the very same thing? Which one of you would not have
thrown the child out the window?” (23:19)
The poor woman’s environment is to blame, not the defendant herself, this imagined
lawyer would argue in defending the accused in a court of law. Dostoevsky thus mocks
the way that many defense attorneys, including Utin in his defense of Kairova, were
blaming the defendant’s environment for the crimes their poor, unfortunate clients had
committed, playing on the soft-heartedness of the jury members. “He who has too much
pity for the offender probably has no pity left for the offended,” Dostoevsky observes
about the tactic employed by Kairova’s lawyer. “Mr. Utin would even deny Mrs.
Velikanova her status as the ‘victim of a crime’” (23:16).
This same tactic is used at the Karamazov trial, where Dmitry’s defense counsel
invokes the doctrine of the environment during his summation speech. “Why depict my
client as a heartless egoist and monster?” Fetiukovich asks rhetorically.
He is uncontrolled, he is wild and unruly – we are trying him now for that – but
who is responsible for his life? Who is responsible for his having received such
an unseemly upbringing, in spite of his excellent disposition and his grateful and
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sensitive heart? Did anyone train him to be reasonable? Was he enlightened by
study? Did anyone love him ever so little in his childhood? My client was left to
the care of Providence like a beast in the field. (15:168)
Even the prosecutor, Ippolit Krillovich, acknowledges that Dmitry’s childhood
upbringing perhaps contributed to his later “reckless conduct” as a young adult as well as
to his “wild life” as a junior military officer (15:128).
Rakitin, who is attending the trial as a member of the press corps, is reportedly
writing an article on Dmitry’s case that is designed to advance the doctrine of the
environment as a way of explaining the crime. “He wants to prove some theory,” Dmitry
explains to Alyosha when his younger brother comes to visit him in prison on the eve of
the trial. “He wants to say that ‘he couldn’t help murdering his father, he was corrupted
by his environment,’ and so on. He explained it all to me. He is going to put in a tinge of
Socialism, he says” (15:496). Indeed, when he is called upon to testify as a witness at
Dmitry’s trial, Rakitin, whose speech draws outbreaks of applause from the liberal
members of the audience, attributes the whole tragedy of Dmitry’s alleged crime to “the
habits that have become ingrained by ages of serfdom and the distressed condition of
Russia, due to the lack of appropriate institutions” (15:99). Apparently, Rakitin, the
author of the pamphlet, The Life of the Deceased Elder, Father Zosima, failed to heed the
holy man’s exhortation to his followers that they not say, “Sin is mighty, wickedness is
mighty, our evil environment is mighty, and we are alone and helpless, and our evil
environment is wearing us away and hindering our good work from being done”
(14:290). They must resist blaming their wicked environment for the sins and crimes
they commit; they must instead accept responsibility not only for their own sins and
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crimes, but also for the sins and crimes of others. “There is only one means of salvation,”
Father Zosima had asserted in his exhortation to his fellow monks, “take yourself and
make yourself responsible for all human sin . . . you are to blame for everyone and for all
things” (14:290). Father Zosima’s doctrine of active, selfless love is, of course, the
Christian alternative to the Socialist doctrine of the environment that Dmitry eventually
comes to adopt as part of his moral and spiritual regeneration.

The Temporary Insanity Defense: Pathological Affekt

In addition to blaming the environment (rather than holding the actual perpetrator of a
crime personally culpable), Russian juries often rendered compassionate acquittals in
cases where the defendant was deemed to be temporarily insane at the time of the crime
and thus was not fully conscious of what he or she was doing. The temporary insanity
defense relied heavily on the notion of “affekt” – a sudden fit of passion (jealousy, anger,
and so on) triggered by instinctual impulses that led the defendant to act in a violent
manner. In the Kairova case, Utin argues that his client was temporarily driven out of her
mind by the wild flood of emotions she experienced when she came upon her lover and
his wife lying in bed together at the dacha Kairova and Velikanov were renting in a
Petersburg suburb. “But, after all, gentlemen of the jury, is it really possible that this
woman could remain calm?” Utin asks rhetorically in regard to Kairova’s angry, jealous
outburst.
The man she’s passionately in love with – in her bedroom, in her bed, with
another woman! That was beyond her strength. Her emotions roiled up inside her
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like a stormy torrent that destroys everything that stands in its path: she ranted and
raved, she was capable of destroying everything around her . . . (23:15)12
Her soul dominated by passion, her mind consumed by jealousy, how could she not have
reacted as she did when she came upon Mrs. Velikanova in bed with her lover? “She
would have had to be made of stone, gentlemen of the jury; she would have had to be
without a heart,” Utin asserts (23:15), for the defendant to have acted any differently than
the way she did. “She would not have been a woman, but a stone, a creature without a
heart” (23:16). Although Dostoevsky in his commentary on the case states unequivocally
that he does not for a moment believe that Kairova was temporarily insane at the time of
her violent assault upon Mrs. Velikanova, she nonetheless was acquitted (23:8).
In The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky discredits this medical line of defense in
large part by having the flighty Mme Khokhlakova be the one who tries to explain to
Alyosha, on the eve of the trial, what exactly a “judicial affekt” [судебный аффект] is:
“A judicial affekt. A state of temporary insanity in which everything is pardonable.
Whatever you might have done, you are acquitted at once . . . Well, you see, a man
may be sitting there perfectly sane and suddenly suffer a fit of passion. He may be
conscious and know what he is doing and yet be in a state of temporary insanity.
And there’s no doubt that Dmitry Fyodorovich was suffering from affekt. They
found out about affekts as soon as the law courts were reformed. It’s all the
beneficial effect of the reformed law courts.” (15:17-18)
Mme Khokhlakova is confident that Mitya will be acquitted of the charge of murder
because although he did indeed kill his father, he struggled against the affekt he was
suffering. When Alyosha assures her that his brother did not commit the crime that he is
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wrongly accused of perpetrating, Mme Khokhlakova abruptly changes her mind. She
now claims that old Grigory, who was likewise suffering from affekt (due to the blow to
the head he received from Dmitry), is the one who murdered Fyodor Pavlovich. But she
insists that it would be better – “ever so much better” – if Dmitry were the one who
murdered Fyodor Pavlovich:
it would be better if it were he, as you’d have nothing to cry over then, for he did it
when he was unconscious or rather when he was conscious, but he did not know
what he was doing. Let them acquit him – that’s so humane, and would show what
a blessing the reformed law courts are . . . And if he is acquitted, make him come
straight from the law courts to have dinner with me here. I’ll arrange a party with
friends, and we’ll drink to the reformed law courts. (15:18)
“And, besides, who isn’t suffering from temporary insanity, nowadays?” Mme
Khokhlakova asks Alyosha rhetorically. “You, I, we are all of us in a state of affekt, and
there are ever so many examples of it: a man sits singing a romance, when suddenly
something annoys him, so he takes out a pistol and shoots the first person he comes
across, and then they all acquit him” (15:18-129). Mme Khokhlakova’s muddle-headed
explanation of what a judicial affekt is, and especially her rabid defense of the
compassionate acquittals due to pathological affekt that are now being rendered by the
reformed courts, anticipates the liberal opinion that will be widely shared by the women
who are in attendance in the courtroom at Dmitry’s trial.
At the trial itself, Dostoevsky further discredits the temporary insanity defense by
providing readers with the comic scene in Book 12, Chapter 3, where three different
doctors are called to the stand as medical experts to provide their professional opinion
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about Dmitry’s mental condition. Seventy-year-old Doctor Gertsenshtube, the kindly and
much-beloved town physician, states directly and unequivocally that the “abnormality” of
the defendant’s mental capabilities is self-evident not only by his many previous actions,
but also by his actions at the present time: that is, when Dmitry strode into the courtroom,
he was looking straight ahead of himself, when it would have been more natural for him
to be looking over to his left, where the women were sitting, “for he is a great admirer of
the fair sex and he should have given quite a lot of thought to what these ladies would say
about him” (15:103-104). The celebrated forensic doctor from Moscow, whom Katerina
Ivanovna had hired specifically to pursue the “medical line of defense” and to prove, as
Alyosha put it, “that Mitya is insane and committed the murder when he was in a state of
madness and thus did not know what he was doing” (15:10), likewise insists that the
defendant’s mental condition is “abnormal in the highest degree” (15:104). The Moscow
doctor maintains that for several days prior to his arrest the defendant had “undoubtedly
been in a state of pathological affekt and that if he did commit the murder, then it must
have been almost involuntarily, even though he might have been conscious of it, for he
did not have the strength to fight against the morbid pathological impulse that possessed
him” (15:104). As proof that all of Dmitry’s actions were “in contravention of common
sense and logic,” the celebrated doctor notes that the defendant, when he was entering the
courtroom, where his fate would be decided, should have looked not to the left, where the
women were sitting, but instead to the right, “seeking out with his eyes the defense
counsel, in whose assistance all his hope was invested and upon whose defense his whole
fate now rested” (15:104, 105). The third medical expert, however, the level-headed
Doctor Varvinsky, who clearly seems to be speaking for the author here, testifies that in
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his opinion the defendant was now – and has been all along – in a perfectly normal
mental state. Although Dmitry might indeed have been in a nervous and exceedingly
excited condition in the days leading up to his arrest, this was no doubt due to jealousy,
anger, and continual drunkenness. But this nervous condition did not include any
temporary insanity or any pathological affekt. And as for the question of what direction
the defendant should have been looking when he entered the courtroom, Dmitry quite
naturally looked straight ahead, where the presiding judge and the members of the court
were sitting, because his whole fate now depended upon them. In Doctor Varvinsky’s
opinion, this shows that Dmitry was perfectly sane at that moment (15:105).
The final blow that Dostoevsky delivers to the validity and legitimacy of this
medical line of legal defense at the trial comes from the mouth of Dmitry’s own attorney.
In his summation speech, Fetiukovich not only speculates about how Smerdyakov (the
actual murderer) might have experienced a “sudden and irresistible impulse,” a “terrible
lust for money” (15:165) that prompted him to kill and then rob Fyodor Pavlovich. He
also suggests that Dmitry himself suffered a similar uncontrollable fit of anger when
encountering the victim on the night of the murder.13 If Dmitry’s sexual rival had been
someone other than his father, Fetiukovich argues, then he might have simply struck and
shoved the man he suspected of secretly harboring his beloved. But that rival for
Grushenka’s affections was none other than Fyodor Pavlovich, the man whom Dmitry
viscerally detested:
The mere sight of the father who had hated him from his childhood, had been his
enemy, his persecutor, and now his monstrous, unnatural rival, was enough! A
feeling of hatred came over him involuntarily, irresistibly, clouding his reason. It
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all surged up in an instant! It was an affekt of madness and insanity, but also an
affekt of nature, irresistibly and unconsciously (like everything in nature) avenging
the violation of its eternal laws. (15:172)
The defense counsel thus argues that if Dmitry did indeed strike Fyodor Pavlovich with
the pestle, it was not only an act of temporary insanity, but also an impulsive and
uncontrollable act that was “natural” and thus justified. It was Katerina Ivanovna, of
course, who insisted that Fetiukovich pursue this medical line of defense in court and
who hired the Moscow doctor – “the one who can identify madmen” (15:103) as Mme
Khokhlakova put it – to prove that Dmitry was suffering an affekt and thus temporarily
insane at the time of the murder. But Dmitry himself will have none of that. “Don’t
believe the doctors,” he tells the members of the jury bluntly near the end of his trial. “I
am perfectly sane,” he assures them (15:175-176).

Compassionate Acquittals: Decriminalizing Crimes of Passion

In arguing that the defendants are not guilty of the criminal charges filed against them,
both Utin and Fetiukovich thus sought compassionate acquittals for their clients not only
by invoking the doctrine of the environment, but also by pursuing the temporary insanity
plea. They claimed that both Nastasya Kairova and Dmitry Karamazov were suffering
from an affekt, a fit of anger that had rendered them unconscious of what they were
doing, and thus they were not culpable for their actions. The two defense attorneys do
not stop there, however. Each of them proceeds to argue that the violent act his client
allegedly committed was not really a crime at all. Just as Spasovich had argued in the
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Kronenberg case that his client was not a “torturer” but rather a well-intentioned (if
poorly trained) father, who was simply trying to fulfill his parental duties by disciplining
an unruly child, Utin argues that Kairova was not attempting to murder her sexual rival
when she attacked Velikanov’s wife with a razor. She was instead acting naturally and
instinctively, like a protective lioness, defending her cub from possible harm by an
intruder. In this way, Utin, as Dostoevsky puts it, essentially “sings praises to crime,”
portraying his client in an idealized, romantic, and fantastic light, and characterizing her
jealous, possessive, carnal love for a married man as something inherently appealing,
ennobling, and highly moral (23:15). In The Brothers Karamazov, Fetiukovich likewise
“sings praises” to his client’s alleged crime. He portrays Dmitry in court not as a
violence-prone young man intent upon committing parricide, but rather as a tenderhearted soul, a “noble and lofty creature,” who “thirsted for tenderness, goodness, and
justice” (15:169). But he received only cynical taunts, suspicions, and wrangling about
money from a negligent father who stole his son’s inheritance and tried to lure the
woman he loved away from him. This unworthy father and despised rival aroused so
much anger, hatred, and jealousy inside his eldest son that Dmitry was unable to control
the sudden outburst of powerful emotions that overtook him when he encountered his
father at the window of his home that fateful evening. “Such a murder is not a murder,”
Fetiukovich proclaims defiantly near the end of his summation speech. “Such a murder
is not a parricide. No, the murder of such a father cannot be called parricide. Such a
murder can only be reckoned parricide by prejudice” (15:172). Dmitry’s defense counsel
thus echoes the words of the Grand Inquisitor, who contends, in direct opposition to
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Christ’s defense of moral voluntarism, that humanity will one day progress to the point
where it will proclaim, “There is no crime, and therefore no sin” (14:230).
The decriminalization of a violent crime of passion that Fetiukovich advocates
during Dmitry’s trial is endorsed by the “court ladies” who attend the legal proceedings
in large numbers. The narrator informs us that the vast majority of the women present in
the courtroom (they number at least half of the audience) took Mitya’s side and were in
favor of his being acquitted. This, the narrator surmises, was perhaps owing to “his
reputation as a conqueror of female hearts” (15:90). Moreover, just about everyone felt
that the criminal was guilty, “obviously and conclusively guilty” (15:95). Even the
women in attendance, who favor and desire the acquittal of this “fascinating” defendant,
were at the same time unanimously convinced that he was guilty.
That he would be acquitted all the ladies, strange to say, were firmly persuaded up
to the very last moment. “He’s guilty, but he’ll be acquitted, from motives of
humanity, in accordance with the new ideas, the new sentiments that have come
into fashion,” and so on. And that was why they had crowded into the court so
impatiently. (15:95)
The trial thus interests the “court ladies” mainly for the way it promises to reprise a
highly romantic narrative about a violent crime of passion committed by a jealous lover
who fatally encounters his sexual rival. They are confident, moreover, that the defendant,
although guilty of having committed the crime, will be acquitted, because they subscribe
to liberal European sentiments that valorize romantic love over conjugal love and that
view human behavior as being guided deterministically by nature, instinct, and heredity
rather than by outdated moral and religious principles. Social Darwinism’s creature of
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heredity and environment has apparently replaced for them Christianity’s free-willed
sinner. For them, committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean being culpable for
having committed it.
The “court ladies,” however, are not to be confused with the simple peasants and
lower-class artisans who make up the jury. Fetiukovich, however, gets so caught up in
his bombastic display of courtroom oratory near the end of his summation speech that he
seems to forget which audience he should be addressing: the liberal “court ladies” sitting
in the gallery or the conservative representatives of the common people sitting in the jury
box? By questioning the divine nature of Christ (calling him the “crucified lover of
mankind” rather than “our Lord”), by redefining Christianity as a “humane,” “rational,”
and “philanthropic” secular ideology (rather than a set of religious beliefs characterized
by “mysticism” and “prejudice”), and by deconstructing fatherhood (and, by extension,
the patriarchy) when he insists that children should bestow the name “father” only upon a
deserving male parent who truly merits their love, respect, and affection, Fetiukovich
clearly plays to the liberal, progressive sentiments of the “courtroom ladies” (15:169171). The narrator confirms their approval of the defense attorney’s speech, especially
the second half of the speech, noting the periodic bursts of applause that emanated from
the courtroom audience, particularly from its female members:
Here the orator was interrupted by irrepressible and almost frantic applause. Of
course, it was not the whole audience, but a good half of it applauded. The fathers
and mothers present applauded. Shrieks and exclamations were heard from the
gallery, where the ladies were sitting. They waved their handkerchiefs. 14
(15:171)
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At the conclusion of Fetiukovich’s summation speech, we are told, “the enthusiasm of the
audience burst like an irresistible storm” (15:173). For their part, the “court ladies” felt
that the suppression of such an enthusiasm would be “the suppression of something
sacred” (15:173).
Ippolit Kirillovich’s brief rebuttal to Fetiukovich’s speech, which upbraids the
defense attorney for the way he solemnly declares that calling the murder of a father
“parricide” is nothing but a prejudice and for the way he “corrects” the Gospels, meets
with a much cooler reception from the members of the uneasy courtroom audience. From
them can be heard “exclamations of indignation” at the prosecutor’s illiberal remarks
(15:175). At the conclusion of the prosecutor’s rebuttal, the ladies, who are preparing
themselves for a dramatic moment of general enthusiasm when the expected acquittal
will be announced, are said to be in a state of “hysterical impatience” (15:176) as they
await the jury’s decision. When the guilty verdict is finally announced, a deathlike
silence falls upon the courtroom. “But how shall I describe the state our ladies were in?”
the narrator says. “I thought they would create a riot. At first they could scarcely believe
their ears. Then suddenly the whole courtroom rang with exclamations: ‘What’s the
meaning of this? What next?’” (15:178). The ladies, we are told, leapt up from their
seats, seeming to imagine that the verdict might be at once “reconsidered and reversed”
(15:178). But as someone in the crowd is overheard to say, using a phrase that serves as
the title for the final chapter of Book 12, the peasants, through their guilty verdict, have
“stood up for themselves” (15:178), protecting traditional, conservative Russian values
by rejecting Fetiukovich’s liberal rhetoric, which directly insults them and offends their
sensibilities. They have stood up against the defense attorney’s attempt to decriminalize
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an alleged crime of passion and have instead endorsed Dostoevsky’s imperative,
articulated in his commentary on the Kairova case in Diary of a Writer, that one should
call a crime a crime in a court of law.
By invoking the doctrine of the corrupting environment and the temporary insanity
defense, Russian attorneys like the real-life Utin and the fictional Fetiukovich are, to
Dostoevsky’s mind, not only threatening to erode a core Christian belief in freedom of
will. In “singing praises” to violent crimes of passion, they are also advancing dangerous
Western ideas about love, marriage, and family that threaten the very moral fiber of
Orthodox Russia. As Louise McReynolds suggests in her recent book, Murder Most
Russian: True Crime and Punishment in Late Imperial Russia (2013), Dostoevsky’s
warnings appear to have gone largely unheeded by his fellow countrymen. Her study
shows how in late-nineteenth-century Russia the insanity plea enjoyed increasing success
as a defense strategy that was employed both in actual courtrooms and in the detective
stories and crime fiction that nourished courtroom narratives. As Darwinian determinism
gained ascendance in the philosophical battle with religious voluntarism, it was now
generally acknowledged that heredity and social circumstances play a dominant role in
shaping a person’s behavior. With modern criminologists and forensic physicians
receiving increased prominence in Russian courtrooms, pathological affekt became
widely accepted as a valid psychiatric explanation for why defendants should not be held
culpable for murderous actions that were committed in a fit of anger or as the result of an
emotional outburst.15 Lawyers such as Spasovich and Utin stand at the head of a long
line of defense counsels in late imperial Russia – both real-life lawyers and fictional ones
alike – who would achieve remarkable success in the courtroom by invoking the
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temporary insanity plea (affekt) that Dostoevsky so deeply despised and that he
repudiated so unequivocally in his depiction of the fictional trial of Dmitry Karamazov.

Saving Sinful Souls: The Redemption of Dmitry and Grushenka

In his final novel, Dostoevsky creates not only a fictional version of a defense attorney
whose attempt to gain a compassionate acquittal for his client is ultimately rejected by a
peasant jury that refuses to decriminalize a violent crime of passion. He also creates a
fictional version of the type of promiscuous young defendant whose unruly sensuality
and fatal passion nearly led to the commission of a violent crime. If the lawyer
Fetiukovich is designed to serve as a fictionalized version of Evgeny Utin, then Dmitry
Karamazov can be seen as Dostoevsky’s fictionalized male version of Nastasya Kairova.
In his commentary on the Kairova trial in Diary of a Writer, Dostoevsky took the
defendant severely to task for the carnal nature of her romantic relationship with
Velikanov, the husband of the stabbing victim. He characterized Kairova as a “wretched,
heinous criminal,” one who “represents in essence something so lacking in seriousness,
so careless, so totally uncomprehending and unaccomplished, trivial, licentious,
incapable of self-control, and mediocre” (23:8). In addition to being an emotionally
disordered and psychologically unstable person, Kairova is, in Dostoevsky’s opinion, an
unruly sexual being who is chronically unable to control her impulses of sexual
possessiveness.16 This is why, ostensibly, she brutally attacked Velikanov’s lawful wife
in an outburst of jealous rage. Dostoevsky underscores how Kairova’s unrestrained
carnality is a central issue for him by prefacing his commentary in the May 1876 issue of
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Diary of a Writer with publication of the text of a letter to the editor that he had recently
received from a provincial reader (“Iz chastnogo pis’ma”), inquiring whether he intended
to comment on the Kairova trial in his journal. In this angry letter, the unidentified
correspondent lashes out virulently at the moral depravity of the recently acquitted female
defendant. “It is with a feeling of the deepest repugnance that we read about the Kairova
case,” he writes. “Like a camera lens, this case focuses to reveal a picture of the carnal
instincts that the leading personage of the case (Kairova) developed under the influence
of her cultural milieu . . . out of this milieu there emerged a despotic person who was
unbridled in her carnal lusts” (23:5). It is not an insane woman that one sees throughout
the entire Kairova trial, the correspondent insists. It is instead “a woman who has
reached the extreme limits in her rejection of everything that ought to be held sacred: for
her there exists neither the family nor the rights of another woman – that other woman’s
right not only to her husband, but to her very own life. Everything exists only for the
selfish Kairova herself and her carnal lusts” (23:5). For this angry reader of
Dostoevsky’s journal, Kairova’s acquittal represents “the triumph of an uncontrolled,
passionate nature” (23:5).
Much like the passionate and sexually unruly Kairova, Dmitry emblematizes the
dangers of unrestrained carnality. Rakitin assures Alyosha early in the novel that his
eldest brother is a “sensualist,” that a violent sensuality is, indeed, “the very definition
and inner essence” of Dmitry (14:74). Moreover, Rakitin adds, in the Karamazov family
“sensuality is carried to a disease” (14:74). Alyosha’s fellow seminarian is alluding, of
course, to “Karamazovism” [карамазовщина] – the vicious and violent lechery, the vile
insect lust, the cruel bestiality within human beings – that Maksim Gorky and others at
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the turn of the century deplored in Dostoevsky’s final novel.17 In his conversation with
Alyosha in Book 3 of the novel, where he relates the story of how his tortuous (and
torturous) relationship with Katerina Ivanovna began, Dmitry reveals how this cruel
Karamazovian side of his personality has a distinctly rapacious quality. “I loved vice,”
Dmitry confesses to his brother when relating the story of his initial rendezvous with
Katerina Ivanovna. “I loved the ignominy of vice. I loved cruelty; am I not a bug, am I
not a noxious insect? In fact, a Karamazov!” (14:100).
Well, I felt a phalange spider biting at my heart then – a noxious insect, you
understand? . . . And, bug and scoundrel as I was, she was completely at my mercy,
body and soul. She was hemmed in. I tell you frankly, that thought, that
venomous thought of a phalange spider, so possessed my heart that it almost
swooned with languor. It seemed as if there could be no resisting it; as though I
should act like a bug, like a venomous tarantula, without a spark of pity.” (14:105)
At his trial, Dmitry hears this unflattering self-assessment echoed in the prosecutor’s
psychological profile of him. Like his father, who “saw nothing in life but sensual
pleasures” and who “brought his children up to do the same” (15:126), Dmitry, endowed
as he is with the “broad Karamazov character,” is portrayed by Ippolit Kirillovich as a
spontaneous and frivolous profligate. Even his own defense attorney, as we saw earlier,
paints a picture of Dmitry as a wild, unruly, and uncontrolled young man who was left to
the care of Providence “like a beast of the field” (15:168).18 Fetiukovich’s client very
much appears to the people in his hometown to be, like Kairova, a jealous and passionate
lover who certainly seems capable of (perhaps even intent upon) murdering his sexual
rival.19
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Grushenka is another character in The Brothers Karamazov who seems designed
to serve as a fictional version of the sexually unruly Kairova. At the latter’s trial, the
defense counsel, in an attempt to exonerate his client, had cited the New Testament words
about the woman taken in adultery: “She loved much, and therefore much is forgiven
her” (23:19). In his commentary on the trial, Dostoevsky had strongly objected to Utin’s
application of this Biblical passage to the unrepentant, carnal Kairova. “Christ’s words
did not at all have that kind of love in mind when he forgave the sinful woman taken in
adultery,” Dostoevsky wrote (23:19). Moreover, although Christ did indeed forgive the
woman taken in adultery, he also admonished this sinner to go and sin no more. Christ,
in short, still called what she had done a sin; he did not justify or vindicate her past
behavior. This Magdalene theme is developed in The Brothers Karamazov in connection
with Grushenka, who early in the novel is characterized by various characters as a
shameful, promiscuous “fallen woman.” At the meeting in the monastery in Book 2,
Chapter 6, for instance, Fyodor Pavlovich finds himself compelled to defend Grushenka’s
moral character before the assembled crowd. “What is shameful?” he asks in reply to
Miusov, who referred to her as a “woman of loose behavior” and a shameful “creature”
(14:68). “That ‘creature,’ that ‘woman of loose behavior,’ is perhaps holier than you are
yourselves, you monks who are seeking salvation! She fell perhaps in her youth, ruined
by her environment. But she ‘loved much,’ and Christ himself forgave the woman who
loved much” (14:69). “It was not for such love that Christ forgave her,” breaks
impatiently from the gentle Father Iosif, echoing Dostoevsky’s journalistic retort. “Yes,
it was for such [carnal] love, for that very kind of love, monks, it was!” Fyodor Pavlovich
stubbornly insists (14:69). Dostoevsky thus has the lecherous Papa Karamazov profane
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Christ’s message about spiritual love in exactly the same manner that Utin did when he
defended the adulterous Kairova at her trial.
Dostoevsky links Grushenka even more closely with the Magdalene theme in Book
7, Chapter 3, where she relates to Alyosha the folk tale about the wicked peasant woman
whose onion (her one act of kindness in life had been to give an onion to a beggar
woman) could have saved her from eternal damnation if only she had agreed to share it
with other sinners who had been plunged into a lake of fire. Rakitin has brought the
highly distraught Alyosha to Grushenka’s home, fully expecting to watch this sexual
“tigress” devour carnally his virginal friend, who has been deeply dispirited by the
scandalous odor of corruption that has emanated prematurely from Father Zosima’s
rotting corpse. Grushenka had long ago promised to tear the cassock off the young
novitiate and deflower him, but upon hearing the disturbing news about the death of his
beloved spiritual father and the rapid, malodorous decomposition of his dead body, she
instead gives him an “onion” – that is, she shows him kindness, sisterly love, and deep
compassion. Alyosha, for his part, may be said to give Grushenka an “onion,” in turn, by
seeing her as a kind soul and loving sister rather than as a carnal, predatory beast.20 “So
you have saved the sinner?” Rakitin asks Alyosha sarcastically, after witnessing this
scene. “You have turned the Magdalene on to the true path? Driven out the seven devils,
eh?” (14:324).21 The exchange of “onions” that has taken place between these two
characters has indeed done precisely that, planting within Grushenka the seeds of her
subsequent transformation from a carnal to a more spiritual creature. The change that is
germinating inside Grushenka is noted by Mikhail Makarovich during the preliminary
investigation in Book 9. The elderly police official had always looked upon Grushenka
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as something of a provincial hetaera, but her concern for Dmitry’s well-being during his
questioning genuinely moves him. “Grushenka’s grief, human grief, touched his goodnatured heart,” the narrator tells us, “and tears even stood in his eyes” (14:418). “I was
unfair to her,” Mikhail Makarovich confesses to Mitya in the presence of his law
enforcement colleagues, “she is a Christian soul, gentlemen, yes, I tell you, this is a
gentle soul, and not to blame for anything” (14:418). On the eve of the trial, the
transformation that is taking place inside Grushenka has even become noticeable
physically. “She was very much changed in countenance – thinner and a little sallow,”
the narrator reports. “There were signs of spiritual transformation in her: a steadfast, fine
and humble determination that nothing could shake could be discerned in her” (15:5).
Dmitry likewise undergoes a process of inner transformation from the carnal to
the spiritual. In the first half of the novel, this male emblem of sexual unruliness is
closely associated not with Kairova’s “razor,” but rather with the “knife,” which is
invoked repeatedly as a sharp-bladed weapon used for vindictive murder. Rakitin
predicts to Alyosha that his eldest brother, who has fallen in love with the sexually
appealing Grushenka, will run through his rival, Fyodor Pavlovich, “with a knife”
(14:73). Grushenka, who fears that Dmitry will murder the Polish officer if he were to
find out that the latter is waiting for her at Mokroe, tells Rakitin that she is not afraid of
Dmitry’s “knife” (14:316).22 Rakitin claims that all three of the novel’s arch sensualists –
Fyodor Pavlovich, Dmitry, and Grushenka – are watching one another “with their knives
in their belts” (14:74). The knife, a weapon that Dostoevsky in his essay “Environment”
identifies explicitly with the Socialist doctrine of the environment (“Since society is so
vilely organized, one can only break loose from it with a knife in hand,” 21:16), is thus
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made to serve in The Brothers Karamazov as a symbol of the violent nature of carnal
passion, sexual jealousy, and romantic rivalry. Dmitry, who experiences a rush of
sudden, furious, vengeful anger when he comes face to face with his rival at the window
to his father’s bedroom, by some miracle throws away the symbolic knife of sexual
jealousy that evening. “God was watching over me then,” Dmitry later explains (14:355).
“Whether it was someone’s tears, or my mother prayed to God, or a good angel kissed me
at that instant, I don’t know. But the devil was conquered. But, you see, I didn’t murder
him, you see, my guardian angel saved me” (14:425-426). Unlike Kairova, who violently
attacks her sexual rival with a razor, Dmitry decides to step aside and not stand in the
way of Grushenka’s happiness any longer. When Perkhotin asks him what exactly he
means by “stepping aside,” Dmitry responds, “Making way. Making way for a dear
being, and for one I hate. And to let the one I hate become dear – that’s what making
way means!” (14:363). During his carriage ride to Mokroe, in a “rush of almost
hysterical ecstasy” to efface himself out of a new and unknown feeling of spiritual love
for Grushenka (14:370), Dmitry expands on his intention to “make way,” explaining to
the peasant driver Andrei that he must not “run over” people or “spoil” their lives. “And
if you have spoiled a life – punish yourself,” Dmitry tells him. “If only you’ve spoiled a
life, if only you’ve ruined anyone’s life – punish yourself and go away” (14:371). By the
time he arrives at Mokroe, Dmitry no longer has any thought of attacking the Polish
officer, who had become yet another sexual rival for Grushenka’s love and affection. “In
his mood of doglike submissiveness,” the narrator tells us, “all feeling of rivalry had died
away” (14:378). In sharp contrast to the fate of Kairova, the devil of carnal passion and
sexual rivalry was at last being conquered in the soul of the spiritually renewed Dmitry.
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After he decides to “step aside” and “make way” for any romantic rivals that
Grushenka may prefer over him and after his intense questioning by the law enforcement
officials at the preliminary investigation in Book 9, when he is literally as well as
figuratively stripped naked and forced to confront the violent, brutish behavior he
exhibited during his past life, Dmitry experiences the epiphanic dream about the poor,
suffering “babe.” As he awakens from that dream, Dmitry announces, “I want to suffer
and by suffering I shall be purified! . . . I accept my punishment, not because I killed him
[Fyodor Pavlovich], but because I meant to kill him, and perhaps I really might have
killed him” (14:458).23 During his incarceration in jail while awaiting trial, Dmitry
describes to Alyosha how the nature of his love for Grushenka has changed drastically.
“In the past it was only those infernal curves of hers that tortured me,” he tells his
younger brother, “but now I’ve taken all her soul into my soul and through her I’ve
become a man myself” (15:33). Both Dmitry and Grushenka are able to undergo this
spiritual transformation only after they recognize their sinfulness, acknowledge their
culpability, and feel genuine remorse for the evil they have done and the pain they have
inflicted upon others.24 This, of course, is where the two fictional versions of Nastasya
Kairova in Dostoevsky’s novel differ sharply from their real-life model. In his
commentary on the Kairova case in Diary of a Writer, Dostoevsky voiced his strong
displeasure over the way the defendant steadfastly refused to acknowledge that she was
the offending party in this case. He was upset that Kairova persisted in feeling that it is
exactly the other way around: that she was the victim in this episode, that she had done
nothing wrong. He castigated her defense attorney as well for reinforcing at her trial how
his client should not feel any guilt for the actions she had committed: she was a protective
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mother lion that was instinctively defending her cub from harm, and her brutal razor
assault upon the victim was simply a “natural” act. As Dostoevsky pointed out, Utin’s
vindication of Kairova’s actions stood in the way of the defendant recognizing,
acknowledging, and regretting the evil she had done. Dostoevsky observed that the
lawyer’s words in defense of Kairova’s actions refuse to allow for “any other clearer,
more noble and magnanimous outcome” to her situation (23:15). The “more noble and
magnanimous outcome” that Dostoevsky was alluding to here is no doubt the redemptive,
salvific kind of spiritual transformation that both Dmitry and Grushenka are able to
undergo after they throw away the violent “knife” that symbolizes sexual rivalry, carnal
possessiveness, and passionate jealousy.

Dangerous Tribunes: Russian Lawyers Versus Russian Novelists

As was noted at the outset of this article, one of Dostoevsky’s main concerns about Utin’s
courtroom defense of his client – and ultimately about Kairova’s compassionate acquittal
itself – is the unsound moral message it sends both to the defendant personally and to the
Russian public at large. “After all, the tribunes of our new courts are truly a school of
ethics for our educated society and for our common people,” Dostoevsky writes in Diary
of a Writer. “This is the school in which our common people learn truth and morality;
how, then, can one listen with sang-froid to the things one sometimes hears from these
tribunes?” (23:19). In The Brothers Karamazov, where the novelist is in a position to
depict a fictional trial that responds to actual legal cases in Russia at the time, Dostoevsky
avails himself of the opportunity to excoriate the clever methods that Russian lawyers –

27

such “adulterers of thought” as Spasovich and Utin – were employing in the courtroom to
gain compassionate acquittals for their guilty clients: namely, their invocation of the
doctrine of the environment, their temporary insanity defense (affekt), and their
decriminalization of crimes of passion. As Ippolit Kirillovich charges in his brief
rebuttal, Dmitry’s defense attorney is guilty of disseminating dangerous liberal ideas
about Christianity, fatherhood, and the family to the Russian public. In having the
peasant jury “stand up” for itself, rejecting Fetiukovich’s attempt to vindicate a brutal
crime of passion, Dostoevsky seeks to stem the flow of these pernicious ideas that were
emanating from the tribunes of the newly reformed Russian law courts in general and
from the Kairova trial in particular. The author’s aim in having the jury wrongly convict
the wild and unruly Dmitry, whose jealous, possessive love for Grushenka tempted him
to attack violently his main sexual rival, was to reverse the egregious “judicial error” that
was committed at the Kairova trial when the unrepentant defendant was wrongly
acquitted. Through the jury’s guilty verdict in the Karamazov trial, Dostoevsky is
insisting that violent crimes of passion, triggered by angry emotional outbursts, must still
be recognized as crimes and not exonerated or vindicated by Russian lawyers and,
ultimately, by the Russian public.
Readers of The Brothers Karamazov occupy a privileged position, of course, in
regard to Dmitry’s murder trial and to the ostensible “judicial error” that occurs there.
They are given access to the inner lives of the key players in this tale of a jealousy and
sexual rivalry, a perspective that is denied to the other characters in the novel who are
following the legal proceedings in the courtroom. As the prosecutor and the defense
attorney, by turns, compose opposing narratives [романы] about who committed the
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murder of Fyodor Pavlovich and as they paint opposing profiles of the personality and
character of the two main murder suspects [психология], the townspeople who are
attending the trial, unlike readers of the novel, do not know who the “real” Dmitry and
the “real” Smerdyakov truly are. Nor do they know that the love between Dmitry (who
strongly resembles the sexually unruly Kairova) and Grushenka (who appears to be
another seductive, licentious femme fatale) has been undergoing a radical transformation
from the carnal to the spiritual, from eros to agape. “The Russian court,” Fetiukovich
proclaims at the end of his summation speech, “does not exist for the punishment only,
but also for the salvation of the fallen” (15:173). “Let other nations think of retribution
and the letter of the law,” he continues, “we will cling to the spirit and the meaning of the
law – the salvation and the reformation of the lost” (15:173). Readers of the novel know
full well that Dmitry’s unscrupulous defense attorney is shamelessly pandering here to
the Christian principles and patriotic feelings of the jury members, hoping to gain a
compassionate acquittal for his client. They also know that Dmitry is already well on the
path to redemption and salvation even before the trial begins. They are fully aware,
moreover, how the author of The Brothers Karamazov insists that those fallen creatures –
such as Nastasya Kairova, Dmitry Karamazov, and Grushenka Svetlova – whose
unbridled sexual lusts cause them to contemplate (or even to commit) evil actions, must
seek genuine redemption and salvation by acknowledging their sinfulness, accepting their
culpability, and seeking their transformation from selfish, carnal beasts to selfless,
spiritual human beings. These sinners will not achieve redemption and salvation, as
Fetiukovich contends, by having the jury exonerate their evil actions and overwhelm
them with its mercy. Russian lawyers, as “hired consciences,” may well feel compelled
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to “sing praises to crime” in order to serve their client’s legal interests (in accordance
with the adversarial system of justice). But Russian novelists, Dostoevsky suggests, are
in a much better position to serve truth and justice by presenting readers with personal
narratives and psychological profiles that reveal how true reformation of the fallen and
true salvation of the lost can be achieved in their homeland.
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In a footnote that follows this passage, Susan McReynolds Oddo, the editor of the

Norton Critical Edition of The Brothers Karamazov, writes: “Rakitin refers to the Gospel
story of Mary Magdalene, who rejected a life of sin and became one of the most devoted
followers of Christ. According to the Gospels, he performed an exorcism on her,
expelling the ‘seven devils,’ and she was the first person to see him after his resurrection.
See Mark 16.9 and Luke 8.1-2” (p. 308, fn. 4).
22

Grushenka warns that she herself might take a knife with her when she goes to Mokroe

(to settle the score with the officer who seduced and then abandoned her). Alyosha is
confident, however, that Grushenka, in her generous heart, has already forgiven the
Polish officer and thus “won’t take a knife with her” (14:321). When Alyosha sees
Grushenka during his moment of ecstasy in the “Cana of Galilee” scene, he says: “She
has come to the feast . . . No, she hasn’t taken the knife, no, she hasn’t” (14:326).
23

Grushenka similarly acknowledges her sinfulness and accepts blame for her part in the

murder of Dmitry’s father: “It was my fault, accursed I am! Mine! My wickedness! . . .
He was mad then, perfectly mad, and that was my fault, mine, wretch that I am!” (15:10).
24

“Recognition of one’s own guilt brings forgiveness,” Carol Apollonia writes in

Dostoevsky’s Secrets: Reading Across the Grain (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 2009), when explaining the dynamics of redemption in Dostoevsky’s fictional
universe. “The moment a person confesses with fullness of spirit, truthfully and
reverently, to having committed an act of evil, he or she is by that act of confession
purged and forgiven.” See pp. 11, 129.

35

